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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This is an
Prisoner,

appeal from

a felony of

a conviction of

the Second Degree.

Aggravated Assault by

Jurisdiction vests

a

in this Court

pursuant to Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 78-2A-3 Utah
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Was
Defendant

the

and the

review for a

introduction
preparation and

a

surprise

strategy of

witness

his case?

trial Court's ruling on the admissabi1ity

of discretion;" whether
reasonab i iity.
must be

of

the trial court's decision

State v. Archuleta, 850 P2d 1232

prejudicial
The

to

standard of

of evidence is "abuse

was beyond the limits
(Utah 1993j.

to a level of the likelihood of a different result.

of

Such prejudice

State__y_._Jinight,

734 P2d 913 (Utah 1993).
Was the show

of force in

the courtroom during

prejudicial to the jury's perception of the Defendant?
is lack

of due process.

Constitution.

Under the Fourteenth

verdict?

State v. Mitchell, 824 P2d 469 (Utah App. 1991).

jury room during the jury's
The

The standard of review

Amendment of the United States

Was the iiiipi upei presence of a tnird party
in the

closing arguments

standard of review

iaw enrofceineut ui i i^ei

deliberations prejudicial to an impartial
is lack of

Supra.
1

due process.

State v.

Young,

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS,
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES
Rule 16(a)(g), Utah Rules Criminal Procedure
Rule 17(e) Utah Rules Criminal Procedure
Rule 26 Utah Rules Criminal Procedure
Set forth verbatim in Addendum.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant Anthony Sterling

was charged by Information

Aggravated Assault by a Prisoner in violation of
Code Annotated
Juan County,
1992,

1953 as amended in
State of

Utah, for

Defendant was accused of
B.

Section 76-5-103,5(1),

the Seventh District Court in
acts allegedly

with

occurring on

Utah

and for San
September 29,

assaulting a iailer with a men wn'nqer.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.
After

Preliminary Hearing

on February

4, 1993,

Defendant

waived all formal bind over procedures and entered a plea of not guilty in the
Upper Division.

After

Discovery on May 6,
26j.

a change of

Counsel, Defendant

filed a Request

1993, properly served on the prosecutor

by mail.

for

(R-25-

As part ot discovery, Defendant requested in paragraph 9
The names and addresses of all the witnesses the
prosecutor proposes to call at the time cf trial not
supplied in response to the above requests (R-27).
On

May 17,

1993 the

San Juan County

Attorney responded

Discovery Request and filed a Certificate of Service (R-31).

2

to the

Trial by jury was conducted before the Honorable Lyle R. Anderson,
Judge over two days August 20 and 23, 1993.
On the
an investigator

first day of trial the State called as a witness Rex Dana,

for the Department of Corrections

(Trial Transcript Vol. II,

p. 122). The testimony was a surprise to the Defendant as Mr. Dana's name had
not been disclosed.

A timely objection

was made to the

Dana's testimony (Transcript Vol II, pp 119-121.)

introduction of Mr.

See also transcript Vol. II

pp 202-204 and list of prosecution subpoenaed witnesses R-36-51.
During
law enforcement
rubbing
within

closing arguments, unbeknownst

officer sat

the butt end of his
the view

of the

behind

to counsel or

the Defendant

brandishing a

gun in an unsnapped holster.

jury and

(Transcript Vol. IV pp 392-96).

were such

the Court a
weapon

by

Such actions were

that Defendant

felt threatened

Defendant asked for a mistrial, but the Court

made a determination that he had not requested the same (Transcript Vol. IV, p
396).

The withdrawal of that Motion is not explicit in the record.
Subsequent to the discussion of the armed bailiff, the Court

advised Defendant and
room
person

during part
involved

his Counsel that

a bailiff had

of their deliberations
was

questioned

about

entered into the

(Transcript Vol. IV,
his

interaction

396-99).

with

the

jury
The

jurors.

Although the bailiff attempted to downplay his interaction with the jurors and
stated

"the evidence was

there, that they

398).
3

could-."

(Transcript

Vol. IV, p

C.

Disposition in the Trial Court.
Defendant was

found guilty by the jury

on August 23, 1993.

He was sentenced to a term of not less than one nor more than fifteen years at
the Utah State Prison.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It

was reversible

testimony of an undisclosed witness.

error for the

Court not

to exclude the

If such evidence were excluded, there is

a substantial likelihood of a result more favorable to Defendant.
force by an armed

The show of

officer, in this instance the victim of Defendant's alleged

assault, during closing argument denies Defendant due process and an impartial
jurv.

The

oresence of

a law-enforcement

officer in

the jury

room during

deliberations over an assault on a law enforcement officer puts undue pressure
on the jurors, denying Defendant his right to an impartial jury.

I.

ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY OF SURPRISE WITNESS
At the time of the alleged assault, Defendant was

at the San
block but

Juan County jail

One day,

while in his

cell

outside his "house," Defendant was ordered by a corrections officer

to return to his cell.
order.

on other charges.

an inmate

Defendant questioned the officer's motives for such an

After an exchange between different officers from the control room and

Defendant's

continued

refusal

to

obey

instructions

officers rushed into the cellblock and subdued Defendant.

4

during the

standoff,

Throughout the course of the trial, Defendant's position and
the

thrust of most cross-examination was that although Defendant admitted he

refused

to return

having the mop

to his

cell after

wringer and other items in

ever threatened any officer with them
anyone.

Thus cross examination

whether such
officers
outside

being ordered,

statements were

who had
of the

cell

block

that he

or that he ever had any intent

to harm

focused on the statements

the location

while

made by Defendant

in response to
of the

Defendant made

Indeed, the testimony was that during

he admitted

his possession, he denied

spontaneous or

gathered, and

and while

input from

officers as

statements

or

most of the confrontation the

the

inside or
gestures.
officers

communicated with Mr. Sterling via intercom (eg transcript Vol I, p 75) from a
secure location.
The

impression given to the jury

known to Defendant prior

from those witnesses made

to trial was that although Defendant refused to obey

orders and was perhaps even

recalcitrant, was still that he did

any officers nor was in any position to due to

not threaten

the cell block, as well as the

control room, being sealed.
Perhaps realizing its dilemma, that although
not find Defendant
assault,

a likable

the State

(Transcript Vol

II,

person neither would

introduced, over
pp 119-140).

objection, the
Mr. Dana

was

they find

the jury would
him guilty

testimony of
an investigator

Rex Dana.
for

Department of Corrections on the date of the incident and interviewed Mr.

5

of

the

Sterling the day after (Transcript
report from his investigation

Vol. II, pp 122-24).

and forwarded the same

Mr.

Dana prepared a

to the San Juan

County

Sheriff's Office, the agency under the direct control of the prosecutor in
this case. (Transcript Vol. II, pp 129-30).
of

Mr Dana did not

his Miranda rights prior to interviewing

Neither Mr. Dana's name
day before trial.

advise Defendant

him (Transcript Vol. II, p 127).

nor report was furnished

to the Defendant until

the

(Transcript Vol. II, pp 119-122).
Defendant

claims prejudice

in lack

of time

to adequately

prepare for the testimony of Mr. Dana and adjust his strategy accordingly.
In

a similar

trial court had correctly
under

Rule 16(a).

case the surprise

found the State had

State v. Archuleta, 850
testimony was

before the trial testimony.
continuous
Defendant

duty of
on

the

been

through

here was known

lease constructively.
an

to

The

agency under

P.2d 1232 (Utah

1993).

In that
night

found a violation of

provide discovery
Court order
to the State

or

material

the

Unlike

for some time

before

his reports had

prosecutor's control.

Their failure to so do should not prejudice Defendant.

to

the

voluntary.

It is

prosecutor's duty to ensure that such agencies forward such materials

6

the

disclose

the prosecution the

witness testified that
the

Court found

violated its duty to

Regardless, the court

request, whether

forwarded to

Utah Supreme

only revealed to

prosecutor

Archuleta the information
trial, at

situation the

the

to him.

Although the Archuleta decision did not reverse, the Supreme
Court

did

find in

State

v.

Knight 734

P.2d

913 (Utah

1987),

that like

circumstances required setting aside a conviction.
In Knight
witnesses

before trial that

Supreme Court

State investigator

had lain

in a

took

request.

statements from

file thereafter

articulated two requirements that the

responding to a discovery
identified.

a

First, all

two

(at 915).

The

prosecution must meet in

material must be produced

or

Second, the response must continue on an ongoing basis.
The

result of an incomplete response are noted in Archuleta

at 917:
"The Government notes that an incomplete response to a
specific request not only deprives the defense of
certain evidence, but has the effect of representing
to the defense that the evidence does not exist. In
reliance on
this misleading
representation, the
defense
might
abandon
lines
of
independent
investigation, defenses, or trial strategies that it
otherwise would have pursued.
We agree that the prosecutor's
failure to
respond fully to a ...request may impair the adversary
process in this manner. Id. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3384
(citation omitted)."
Citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)

The

purpose behind

make criminal discovery fair.

continuous discovery

The Archuleta Court

was stated

cited the previous case of

State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656 (Utah 1985):
To meet
a trial
contest
request

basic standards of fairness and to insure that
is a real quest for truth and not simply a
between the parties to win, a defendant's
for information which has been voluntarily

7

as to

complied with, or a court order of discovery must be
deemed to be a continuing request.
And even though
there is no court-ordered disclosure, a prosecutor's
failure to disclose
newly discovered
inculpatory
information which falls with[in] the gambit of Section
77-35-16(a),
after the
prosecution has
made a
voluntary disclosure of evidence might so mislead
defendant as to cause prejudicial error. Id. at 662.
As
"It seems

in Knight,

the non-disclosed

appropriate in such instances to

persuade the Court

that the

error did not

material is

inculpatory.

place the burden on

the State to

unfairly prejudice the

defense."

Although the State may argue that reversal is too

harsh for

Id, at 921.

what admittedly is probably an oversight, there were other
that would

remedies available

have avoided the need for such a remedy at this stage.

count has ample power to obviate any
criminal discovery rules
the substantial

"The tria1

prejudice resulting from a breach of the

and may fashion a

remedy as it sees fit

rights of the Defendant are

not violated."

so long as

Archuleta, supra

at 1243, citing Knight and Carter.
In the instant case there is an additional compelling reason
to reverse due

to the failure to disclose Dana's

of the statements made

testimony.

Prior knowledge

without Miranda would likely have led to a suppression

hearing to totally exclude investigator Dana or his reports.
II. USE OF FORCE IN THE COURTROOM
"It

is well established

that "[a]

principal ingredient of

due process is that every criminal defendant is entitled to a fair and
8

impartial trial."
a fair trial
Estelle v.
(1976).
the

Kennedy, 487 F.2d at 104.

is a

A criminal defendant's right to

fundamental liberty secured

Williams, 425

U.S. 501,

96 S.

by the Fourteenth

Ct.

Amendment.

1691, 1692, 48 L.Ed.2d

126

Further, "[t]he presumption of innocence, although not articulated in

Constitution, is a

criminal justice."

basic component of

a fair trial under

our system of

State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 473 (Utah App 1991).
Defendant contends that the presence of

the law enforcement

officer/"victim" with a weapon adversely affected his right to a fair trial.
The

decision whether to

trial judge, Mitchel1, 473.
the

judge by

the

was the

alleged

victim,

rests in the

In this case however, the decision was taken from

impromptu appearance

Defendant is attenuated by

restrain the accused

The

prejudice to

the fact that the officer making the

show of arms

reinforcing to

of the

the

officer.

jury

that the

accused

is a

dangerous person who must be controlled, either through weapons or themselves.
Even

if this Court finds

there is no adequate showing

of the existence of a

gun, the mere presence of the extra security seated behind Defendant is enough
to garner this Court's

concern.

See e.g. State__v^_..Gardner?

789 P2d 273, 281

(Utah 1989).
Other Courts have found that
measures

makes

it hard

evidence before it.

for

the jury

to

the use of additional security

fairly or

impartially

weigh the

Dickson v. State, 822 P.2d 1122 (Nevada 1992), People

Duram, 16 Cal 3d 282, 1257 Cal. Rptr 618, 625, 545 P.2d 1322, 1329 (1976),

9

y^

cited in Gardner.

"To restrain a Defendant

justification is a ground for
(Or. App 1985).

State v. Glick, 697 P.2d 1002, 1003

See also State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327 (Utah 1993).

III.

IMPROPER COMMUNICATION
DELIBERATIONS
Pursuant

after

reversal."

during trial without substantial

to Rule

BY

17(e) Utah

the jury has begun its deliberations

charge shall not

allow any

BAILIFF

WITH

Rules of

JURORS

DURING

Criminal Procedure,

the officer having them under his

communication to

be made

to them,

or make

any

himself, "It is axiomatic that a Defendant is entitled to a fair and impartial
trial based

on the

evidence presented to

the jury,

influenced by information from outside sources."
1254, ' ^ c

without the jury

being

State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d

(»Jt?.h ^?83) } citing Sheppard v. ^axwcl 1, :?•; -J.S. 332.
Utah law

places the burden on the

prosecution to show that

contact between court personnel and jurors did not influence the jurors.
A rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from any
unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses,
attorneys or court personnel and jurors which goes
beyond a mere
incidental, unintended, and brief
contact
....[w]hen
the
contact
is
more than
incidental, the burden is on the prosecution to prove
that the unauthorized contact did not influence the
juror.
Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 225
citing State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985).
Any such contact denies the Defendant his right to
a fair and

impartial jury in violation

Constitution.

State

Carlson, at 225.

v Durand,

of Article I, Section 12

569 P.2d

1107, 1109

trial by

of the Utah

(Utah 1977),

cited in

In Durand, some jurors went into the sheriff's office for
10

coffee and
present.

conversation on

two occasions.

On one

occasion witnesses

were

While the Supreme Court did not reverse in Durand, it did disapprove

of jurors

going

into the

sheriff's office

or

in engaging

in even

casual

conversation with witnesses.
Again,
heightened

the

the

instant

due to the connection between

in the jury room.
over

in

Jurors

actions

by

case

the

prejudicial

a

law

is

the alleged victim and the intruder

cannot help but be deterred in their

or against

factor

enforcement

officer

deliberations
when

a

law

enforcement officer from the same agency is present with them.
In one instance a sister jurisdiction held that on intrusion
by the bailiff
Foreman v.

for as little

State,

370 P.2d

several cases where
reversible
what
the

as three minutes
34 (Oklahoma

was sufficient for

1962).

The

conduct as innocuous as taking water

error, People v Chambers, 279 Mich. 73,

the officer may have
jury that

is or

suspicion upon the
Knapp 42 Mich.

said or done any more

may be prejudicial

otherwise orderly

267, 3 N.W. 927.

to the

reversal.

Foreman Court

cites

into the jurors was

271 N.W. 556.

"It is not

than his mere presence with
Defendant and

administration of

tend to cast

justice" People

See also State v. Christensen,

v.,

17 Wash App

922, 567 P.2d 654 (1977) and 35 ALR 4th 890.
In
aggravated by factors

the

instant

case

the

possibility

of

prejudice

in addition to the bailiff/victim identity.

from the record that the bailiff gave the jurors some direction.

11

is

It appears
This

direction,

"The evidence was

there, that they

could" (Transcript Vol,

IV P

398, can be construed to mean that sufficient evidence was there that the jury
could convict.

That something

was amiss

in the

bai1 iff/juror contact

indicated by the contray statements made by the bailiff.
397

"I didn't

influence would

speak with
have

them" with

uncertainty

Further undue
to

whether their sanctum could be invaded at any time during their discussion

of

officers.

by the

statements.

at p.

juror as

the Law enforcement

been created

the prior

Cf, statement

is

At any rate,

the State

of the

has not carried

its

burden of disproving prejudice.

CONCLUSION
The

State's charge

locked cellblock against
weak.

Without the

harm,

as well

of aggravated assault

individuals in a

undue influence

individual in a

locked control room

testimony of a surprise

as the

by an

is inherently

witness of Defendant's intent

of an

armed security

to

officer during

closing arguments and the intrusion of a fellow law-enforcement officer in the
jury

room,

there

was

a

substantial

likelihood

of

a

different

Defendant's conviction should be reversed.
DATED this 24th day of January, 1994.

\AS sJJ** A

y^c

William L. Schultz \
Attorney for Defendant

12

result.

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I,

_W/

William

t i

* ~\

L.
,

Appellant's Brief

to the

Schultz,
1994,

I

certify
served

Utah General for

that
four

on

the

copies

the State

L

of

'&)
the

of Utah,

day

of

attached
Counsel for

appellee to this matter, by mailing to him by first class mail with sufficient
postage prepaid to the following address:
Attorney General
State of Utah
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

William L. Schultz
.->

ADDENDUM

AMENDMENT XIV
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges o9r immunities of citizens of the United States; not
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; not deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

RULE 16. DISCOVERY
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1)
revelant written or recorded statements of the defendant or
codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to nbegate the
guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant,m or mitigate the
degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cuase shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable
following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead.
The prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(g) If at any time during the course of theproceedings it brought to
the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule,
the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

RULE 17
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall be kept
together in some covenient place under charge of an officer until they agree
upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Except by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge shall
not allow any communication to be made to them, or make any himself, except to
ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall not, before the
verdict is rendered,
communicate to any
person the state
of their
deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.

CRAIG C, HALLS #1317
San Juan County Attorney
P. 0, Box 850
Monticello, Utah 84535
Phone 587*2128

AUQ 2 3 93
fEVEKTH DISTRICT CGITJ
STATE CFUTM!

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SAN JUAW COUNTY, STATB OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

*

vs.
ANTHONY STERLING,
Defendant(s).

*

FINDINGS, JUDGMENT
AND COMMITMENT
Criminal No* 9217-222

*

THIS MATTER came before the Court for Sentencing on the 23rd
day of August, 1993, before the above entitled Court,

Craig C*

Halls, San Juan County Attorney, attorney for State of Utah, and
Defendant appearing in person and with his attorney, William L.
Schultz.
The Defendant agreeing to wave the minimum 2-day time period
for sentencing, Defendant was found guilty by jury

of Aggravated

Assault by a Prisoner, a Second Degree Felony*
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
that the Defendant be committed to the Utah State Prison to serve
a term not of not less than cue

(1) year nor more than 15 years.

Defendant is to pay restitution to £an Juan County in the sum of
$600•00 as was determined in the disciplinary hearing by the
Corrections Department*

Sheriff of San Juan County is directed to take him into
custody and deliver him forthwith to the warden of the Utah State
Prison.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the original of this Judgment and
Commitment shall be attested to by the Clerk of the Court and that
a certified copy hereof be delivered to said Sheriff or other
qualified officer and that copy serve as the Commitment of the
Defendant and of the Warrant for the Sheriff in taking into
custody, detainingf and delivering said Defendant*

DATED: August 23, 1993

LLL

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

ATTEST:

*^&?^

Clerk of the Court

?

t

